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Abstract
We analyse the consequences of starting a wage subsidised job, “marginal
employment”, for unemployed workers. Marginal employment is a type of
wage subsidy paid to unemployed workers and they do not lose their un-
employment beneﬁts if the wage is below a certain threshold. We ask if
the unemployed who start marginal jobs face better labour market out-
comes than those who do not work. A priori it is not clear if those who
work in marginal employment improve their labour market status, e.g. by
signalling eﬀort, or worsen it by reduced job search eﬀort. We select unem-
ployed workers and investigate the eﬀect of marginal employment on their
labour market outcomes, by means of propensity score matching. Our
results suggest that selection into marginal employment is “negative”, i.e.
workers with characteristics we usually associate with low-productivity are
more likely to select into such jobs. The unemployed who start to work
in marginal employment during their unemployment spell suﬀer a (causal)
penalty for doing so, relative to their peers who do not. The penalty, in
terms of less employment, more unemployment, lower wages, lessens over
time but is still present after three years.
Keywords: marginal employment, atypical employment, labour supply, propen-
sity score matching
JEL classiﬁcation: J22, J641 Introduction
The causes for the high unemployment rates in (Western) Europe are highly de-
bated, among the candidates are high wage levels which reduce the demand for
workers, especially those with low levels of productivity; strict employment con-
tracts and protection laws, which may not allow employers to react ﬂexibly to
short-term demand ﬂuctuations; beneﬁt systems, which are seen to provide lit-
tle incentive for unemployed workers to ﬁnd employment.1 Consequently, many
labour market reforms focus on employment contracts that allow for more em-
ployment ﬂexibility (e.g. the recent attempt in France to extend the probationary
period of youth workers) or incentive schemes to induce unemployed workers back
into employment (e.g. the German Kombilohn).
In Austria, a special employment contract exists, “marginal employment”,
which combines ﬂexibility and incentives. Marginal employment (ME) is deﬁned
by wage income being below a threshold. In 2006, the threshold was e333.16 per
month before tax, or about 19% of the median gross wage. Marginal employ-
ment is an attractive type of contract for employers, because for these jobs social
security contributions are substantially reduced and only minimal employment
protection applies. It is attractive to the unemployed, because an unemployed
worker does not lose any beneﬁt entitlements while working in ME. In other
words, ME provides a wage subsidy paid to the worker (Katz, 1998; Phelps,
1994). This wage subsidy has, for the unemployed claiming unemployment ben-
eﬁts, a discontinuity at the threshold, because beneﬁts are fully withdrawn for
any wage income above the ME threshold.
1Nickell (1997) provides a critical assessment of such arguments.
1We analyse the marginal employment of unemployed workers and examine
whether it facilitates their return to regular employment or not. Potentially, a
marginal job may allow the worker to stay attached to the labour market and
to signal motivation to employers. This way it would act as a “stepping stone”
(Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2002). Alternatively, marginal employment could
ultimately force workers out of the regular labour market, oﬀering merely a “dead
end” (Booth et al., 2002).
To evaluate the outcomes of marginal employment, we analyse new entrants
into unemployment using data from the administrative registers. These data
have the advantage of detailing, for each employee, the complete history of labour
market spells. In the sample, we ﬁnd that upon entry into unemployment many
choose to become marginally employed before they start regular employment.
Marginal employment is thus for many unemployed an option, but how does it
eﬀect their future careers?
We compare the unemployed who start marginal employment before return-
ing to regular employment with those who do not. The data oﬀer a wide range
of outcome measures, we compare the days employed, the days unemployed,
and the wages of the two types of the unemployed for up to three years after
the start of their unemployment spell. The decision to become marginally em-
ployed is most likely correlated with expected future labour market outcomes
and marginally employed workers are then not a random sample of all unem-
ployed workers. Since we have no source of exogenous variation in the entry to
marginal employment, which would allow to model the selection into ME, we use
propensity score matching to control for selection on observable characteristics
(Dehejia and Whaba, 1999; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). The data provide a
wide range of individual characteristics, extended labour market histories, and
2previous experiences with marginal employment for an appropriate estimation of
the propensity score.
There have been a number of studies examining the eﬀect of temporary job
placement on subsequent labour market outcomes over the last years. (Ichino,
Mealli and Nannicini (2006) provide an overview.) Autor and Houseman (2005),
using US data, ﬁnd a negative association between between temporary jobs and
subsequent labour market careers and argue that their ﬁnding is more robust
than European studies because they exploit a semi-experimental setting. The
European studies typically use some sort of matching technique and generally
ﬁnd a positive association between temporary jobs and subsequent labour market
careers.
Our results show that marginal employment is, despite its popularity among
the unemployed, associated with less employment, lower wages, and with more
unemployment in subsequent periods. Although the negative eﬀect of ME lessens
over time, after three years these workers still fare worse than their peers. A
way to improve chances of marginal workers in the labour market and facilitate
transitions to regular employment might be to combine marginal employment
with a more generous wage subsidy or incentive scheme in the context of active
labour market policies, like suggested by Fertig, Kluve and Schmidt (2006).
2 Institutional Background
In Austria, health, pension, and unemployment insurance is compulsory for ev-
ery employee. Social security contributions are split between the employer and
the employee and amount in total to 39.9% of the gross wage. This makes Aus-
3trian non-wage labour costs relatively high (see, for example, U.S. Department
of Labor, 2005, Table 15).
Marginal employment is a special type of contract deﬁned by wage income
being below a certain limit. In 2006, the monthly limit for ME was e333.16, or
about 19% of the median gross wage. Workers who are marginally employed are,
by and large, exempt from compulsory social security. For them, the employer has
to contribute 1.4% of the gross wage towards the employees’ insurance against
work-related accidents. A marginally employed worker may voluntarily enroll
into health and pension insurance by paying e46 per month, or 14% of the
threshold for ME. Marginal jobs are not covered by the unemployment insurance
system. Marginal workers are entitled to their (state) pension payments, or to
unemployment beneﬁts (and unemployment assistance), if eligible.
In Austria, unemployment beneﬁts (UB) amount to 55% of previous net
wages, plus a family allowance. The eligibility period is 20 or 30 weeks, depending
on previous work experience. After exhaustion of UB, the unemployed worker
can apply for unemployment assistance (UA), which is means tested. In case of
continued eligibility, unemployment assistance can be claimed indeﬁnitely. Re-
cipients of unemployment beneﬁts or unemployment assistance are fully covered
by the state health insurance system and the time claiming UB counts towards
state pension eligibility.
The importance of marginal employment in Austria has increased over the
past years. Figure 1 plots the number of ME as a percentage of all employment
from May 1995 to December 2005. Since 1995, employment in marginal jobs has
increased from about 4.6 per cent of total employment to about 7.5 per cent in
2005. In a study about the sales sector in Austria Huber and Huemer (2004)
4ﬁnd a marked increase in marginal employment in retail sales after a relaxation
of shop opening hours in 1997. The majority of marginal workers are women
(70% in 2004). According to Huber and Huemer (2004), women also tend to stay
longer in marginal employment and are less likely to switch to regular jobs than
men.
3 Theoretical Considerations and Model
Marginal employment is a ﬂexible, and cheap, instrument for employers to re-
act to short-term demand ﬂuctuations. The non-wage labour costs paid jointly
by employer and employee are at least halved. In addition, ﬂexible dismissal
regulations apply as for marginal employment the period of notice is 14 days.
Marginal employment is attractive for two groups of workers. The ﬁrst group
are workers who are detached from the labour force, i.e. either not working in
a regular job or out-of-the labour force. A marginal job may provide access to
the social security system and thus relatively cheap access to pension and health
insurance. The second group are unemployed workers, especially those who claim
UB, because income from ME is added to the beneﬁt income.2 We focus on the
second group and investigate the eﬀect of marginal employment started during
an unemployment spell on the worker’s future wage and employment outcomes.
We do not consider that ME may oﬀer an entry to the labour market for persons
who are out-of-the-labour force.
2A third group would be those who want to supply many hours of work, but are hours
constrained in their main job. However, multiple job holding is relatively uncommon in Austria.
Only about 4% of regular workers hold a second job. Likewise, we ﬁnd few workers in two or
more marginal jobs.
5Marginal employment has some features that make it comparable to a wage
subsidy program. A wage subsidy is typically individually based, not means-
tested, and has a limited duration. Where wage subsidies are provided to in-
dividuals, rather than directly to ﬁrms, eligibility usually depends on a certain
duration of unemployment insurance receipt. Usually the wage subsidy also im-
poses a minimum working requirement. Marginal employment, on the other hand,
allows the unemployed beneﬁt recipient to earn extra income if they supply few
hours, or earns a wage below the threshold. As soon as the threshold is crossed,
however, UB is withdrawn completely. Consequently, the unemployed worker
faces a discontinuous hours choice, which is sketched in Figure 2. The graph
draws the relationship between earnings and hours worked for a given wage rate
w. An unemployed worker’s earnings equal the beneﬁt level b. By supplying a few
hours hME of work in a marginal job the worker earns b+ME, beneﬁts plus the
ME threshold. Jobs which put wage income slightly above the marginal threshold
are unattractive, because they generate less income than income from beneﬁts
alone. In order to be strictly better oﬀ the worker would have to supply as many
hours as to receive earnings above the beneﬁt level plus the marginal threshold,
in the graph this is hE. The gap between hME and hE, or the magnitude of
the discontinuity, depends on the beneﬁt level b. Consequently, the discontinuity
may be especially important for full-time workers, as the beneﬁt level depends
on earnings in the previous job.
What are the behavioural responses that we expect from unemployed workers?
Because of the discontinuity in hours choices we expect workers to start a marginal
job and to collect beneﬁts for a prolonged time, or to start a regular job relatively
quickly. This means that the short-term eﬀects of the marginal job are determined
by the behavioural responses generated by the incentives on earnings and hours
6choices. The causal eﬀects of ME on future employment and wage outcomes will
be revealed over a medium time horizon.3
Because there are no special restrictions to receiving the wage subsidy implicit
in marginal employment other than beneﬁt eligibility one may ask whether this
system induces individuals to reduce their work eﬀort in order to beneﬁt from the
subsidy. We think that the sharp discontinuity mitigates the negative incentives
created by this system. In order to address the issue of windfall beneﬁciaries
or collusions between ﬁrms and workers we investigate how take-up varies with
the elapsed unemployment duration and whether employers rehire their former
employees as marginal workers or not.
We choose the following setup for the empirical analysis. We sample work-
ers entering unemployment and compare those taking up ME within the ﬁrst 6
months of their unemployment spell with workers who do not enter ME before
their unemployment spell ends. (We drop individuals entering ME after 6 months
from the sample.) We call the ﬁrst the ME group and the other the control group.
The choice of 6 months appears somewhat arbitrary, but it corresponds to the
average UB entitlement period (remember that the entitlement period is either
20 or 30 weeks depending on prior work experience.)
For these two groups, we compare wage and (regular) employment outcomes
in the ﬁrst, second, and third year after the start of unemployment.
To account for non-randomness in the choice to start ME we use a propensity
score matching technique. The matching is valid, if conditional on all information
available at the start of the unemployment spell starting ME is random. This
3We do not expect special eﬀects to occur upon beneﬁt exhaustion, because the Austrian
system with the combination of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance allows
basically for an unlimited beneﬁt period.
7further implies that at the beginning of the unemployment spell an individual,
with given characteristics, faces a job ﬁnding rate that is known to him and which
is constant over time.
One problem is that the matching approach assumes that the propensity to
work ME is independent of elapsed unemployment duration. For example, if
prospects for regular employment deteriorate over time, an unemployed worker
may become more likely to accept a marginal job. By conditioning on charac-
teristics at the start of the spell we cannot control for time-varying changes of
behaviour. Our strategy to assess the importance of this problem is to check
the robustness of our results by selecting diﬀerent ME groups, based on varying
lengths of elapsed unemployment duration (three, six, and twelve months). We
also estimate the eﬀects of ME for a smaller sample of workers who had no ME
experience in the ﬁve years preceding the unemployment spell. We further exam-
ine the robustness of our results by comparing them to those for the unemployed
who were employed the whole month prior to the unemployment spell.
4 Data
We use data on individual labour market careers from Austrian administrative
records. Our sample consists of the total inﬂow into unemployment between
March and August 1999.4 To avoid conﬂicts with time spent in education, or
(early) retirement, we only consider workers between 20 and 50 years of age.
This leaves us with a sample of 193,276 unemployed. All our analyses are carried
4We deﬁne an individual as unemployed if she is either collecting unemployment beneﬁts or
actively searching for work, but not working in regular employment. For those with multiple
spells in this period, we select the ﬁrst unemployment spell.
8out separately for women (93,896) and men (99,380), because women are more
likely to work in ME than men are.
We combine individual data from two diﬀerent sources, (i) the Austrian social
security database which contains detailed information on the individuals’ employ-
ment, unemployment and earnings history, and information on the employer (e.g.
region and industry); and (ii) the Austrian unemployment register from which
we get socio-economic characteristics. We use information on employment and
wage histories for the period 1993 to 2001, i.e. ﬁve years before and three years
after the start of the spell. The records contain, for each day, information on the
labour market status and we distinguish between regular employment, marginal
employment, unemployment, parental leave, and non-participation.
The median unemployment duration in the sample is 1.8 months (mean is
4 months) and 6% of the individuals are unemployed longer than 12 months.
Unemployment spells end in most cases (80%) because of the start of a regular
employment spell, the remaining unemployment spells end because of withdrawal
from the labour market (maternity, retirement, or other, unknown, reasons.)
Upon entry into unemployment, history and outcomes are measured in one-
year intervals from that date. While the data are appropriate for our research
as they provide precise labour market histories for a long period, they also have
limitations. The most restricting for our application is that the data do not detail
the hours of work and we therefore cannot identify part-time work.5 Wages are
measured as the average of monthly wages over all regular jobs during the year,
and are deﬂated to 2005 prices (in Euros). No wages are available for marginal
5The share of part-time work in all employment in 1999 was 16.4%: 32.4% of women and
4.4% of men worked in part-time jobs in 1999 (Statistics Austria, 2006).
9jobs and the wage is set equal to zero for individuals with no regular employment
during the year.
In Figure 3, we plot for our sample of unemployed workers the monthly share
of marginal workers, from 1994 to 2004. It is apparent that the share of ME
increases sharply upon entry into unemployment. The inﬂow period into un-
employment 03-08/1999 is marked by vertical lines. During that time marginal
employment increases by about two percentage points for women and by about
one percentage point for men. Over the following six months the shares of ME re-
vert to the trend. This suggests that on becoming unemployed workers are more
likely to start a marginal job. The ﬁgure also conﬁrms the high share of women
in marginal employment noted by Huber and Huemer (2004). The trend in our
sample resembles the trend of marginal employment for the whole population,
plotted in Figure 1.
Figure 4 shows the frequency of ME starts by the elapsed unemployment du-
ration. We see that the majority of ME spells start a short time after entry into
unemployment, most of the marginal spells start within 2 months form unem-
ployment entry. Usually it requires some time to search for a (marginal) job and
the picture conﬁrms that we capture most of the workers who start ME within 6
months upon entry to unemployment.
Table 1 presents the incidence of marginal employment in our sample and
describes the composition of ME and control groups our analysis is based on.
The control group consisting of individuals who never take up a marginal job
before returning to regular employment, or before their unemployment spell ends
is 178,427 individuals (84,105 women). We have 11,965 individuals taking a
marginal job within 6 months of becoming unemployed. The share of marginal
10workers among women (8.5%) is twice as high as among men (4.2%). If we
restrict the ME group to individuals taking up ME within the ﬁrst three months
of unemployment the share of marginal workers in the full sample (consisting of
ME and control group) is reduced to 4.7% on average, whereas it is 7.7% if we
allow for all individuals taking a marginal job during the ﬁrst year.
As a separate robustness check we will restrict the sample to individuals who
were employed for at least one day in the month before entering unemployment.
This reduces the sample by about 25%, the share of marginal workers remains
the same though.
To address the potential problem of windfall beneﬁciaries or collusion between
employers and employees who agree to substitute regular employment for UB
plus ME, Table 2 presents recall rates to the same employer among the various
employment states. The overall recall rate in the Austrian economy, i.e. those
who work for the same employer before and after the unemployment spell, is
relatively high (Pichelmann and Riedel, 1992), in our sample the recall rate is
some 33 per cent for women and about 22 per cent for men. The recall rate
from a marginal job to regular employment, for individuals ﬁnding a job after
unemployment, is 27% and about as high as the overall rate. It occurs much
less often that an employer lays oﬀ an individual from a regular job and rehires
them as marginal worker. The recall rate from a regular job to a marginal job
is only 15%. This means that the number of windfall beneﬁciaries generated by
ME cannot be particularly high, as we expected.
In the Appendix, Table A-1, we present descriptive statistics, separately for
the ME and the control group. If we consider age, educational attainment or
marital status, we see little diﬀerences between women who started ME and
11those who did not. When we consider past labour market experiences, we ﬁnd
that more of those who started ME have had previously worked in ME than
those in the control group, suggesting that some persistence is present in those
who work ME. In the year before the start of the unemployment spell, women
who started ME had worked on average some 82 days in ME. This contrasts with
an average of some 20 days for those who did not start ME. Those who started
ME have had fewer employment spells in the year preceding the unemployment
spell (women, 1.2, and men, 1.5) than those who did not (women, 1.5, and men,
1.7). The diﬀerence between the two groups in terms of days employed is about
two weeks for women and about one week for men, with those who did not start
ME having worked more days. On average, those who did not start ME had
higher wages (women: e966 vs. e811; men: e1,418 vs. e1,273).
Those who started ME have had, two years earlier, consistently fewer days in
regular employment, they had earned lower wages, and they have had more days
in ME than those in the control group. The farther we go back in time, however,
the smaller the diﬀerences between the two groups become.
Looking at the descriptive statistics of the outcome variables, we observe that
those who chose ME had spent, on average, fewer days in (regular) employment,
spent more days in unemployment, and earned a lower wage than those in the
control group. Over time, the diﬀerences become smaller, but they do persist.
In the third year after the start of the unemployment spell, apart from the men-
tioned diﬀerences in wages, hardly any diﬀerences remain for women; for example,
average days employed were 216 (control) and 213 (ME) days. Diﬀerences are
greater for men. Men who chose ME spent about three weeks less in employment
than those who did not choose ME, their wages were about 10% lower, and their
average unemployment duration was about a week longer.
125 Method
Our aim is to estimate the average eﬀect of marginal employment (ME) on labour
market outcomes for those unemployed who start ME before they enter regular
employment. In order to estimate the “average treatment eﬀect on the treated”
(ATT), we would like to compare labour market outcomes for unemployed workers
who started ME with the counterfactual outcome in case they did not start ME.
Since we never observe both outcomes for the same individual, we need to com-
pare observations on individuals entering marginal employment (ME group) with
observations on individuals who do not (the control group). A direct comparison
of average outcomes of these two groups of unemployed may be confounding the
true eﬀect, because an individual’s decision to start ME is most likely related
to expected future labour market outcomes. For example, imagine that highly
skilled workers are less likely to start ME than those with few skills. As a con-
sequence of the diﬀerent skill compositions in the ME and the control group, we
may observe diﬀerences in mean wage outcomes in both groups, which are not
driven by ME, but by diﬀerences in productivity.
In order to control for such factors confounding the true eﬀect of ME, our
strategy is to compare the outcomes for individuals who are as similar as possible
in terms of their predetermined characteristics. The main assumption is that
selection into ME is based on observable characteristics and conditional on this
information the individual’s decision to start ME is random.
To be more speciﬁc, let Yi1 be individual i’s outcome variable if she enters
ME, and Yi0 the counterfactual. Further, let T1 be an indicator variable equal 1
13if the individual decides to enter ME, and 0 if she does not. The ATT, or the
average eﬀect ME has on those who start ME, can be expressed as
ATT = E(Yi1|Ti = 1) − E(Yi0|Ti = 1).
As mentioned before, this expression cannot be estimated directly, because Yi0
is not observed for ME individuals. Assuming selection on observable covariates
Xi, namely Yi1,Yi1 ⊥ Ti|Xi, we obtain
E(Yij|Xi,Ti = 1) = E(Yij|Xi,Ti = 0) = E(Yi|Xi,Ti = j)
for j = 0,1. In other words, the assumption means that conditional on observable
variables Xi there is no systematic diﬀerence between the ME group and the
control group at the point of entry into unemployment. It allows us to identify
the average treatment eﬀect on the treated in the following way:
ATT = E [E(Yi|Xi,Ti = 1) − E(Yi|Xi,Ti = 0)|Ti = 1].
A nonparametric estimate may still be diﬃcult to obtain, if X has many di-
mensions and it would amount to ﬁnding a perfect counterpart for every ME
individual in the control group. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) have shown that
the information in Xi can be summarised in a single variable, the propensity
score p(Xi). The propensity score is the conditional probability that individual i
with observable covariates Xi is taking up ME,
p(Xi) = P[Ti = 1|Xi] = E(Ti|Xi).
14Therefore, instead of comparing individuals with identical X’s, it is suﬃcient to
compare individuals with similar values of the propensity score and estimate the
ATT by
ATT = E [E(Yi|p(Xi),Ti = 1) − E(Yi|p(Xi),Ti = 0)|Ti = 1].
The empirical estimation proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate the propensity
score, separately for women and men. Conditional on the propensity score each
individual has the same probability of taking a marginal job, as in a randomised
experiment. We use this proposition to assess our estimates of the propensity
score and group observations into blocks with similar values of the estimated
propensity score to check whether the distributions of the observed covariates for
ME and controls coincide in each group or not (“balancing” the distributions).
The estimation of the propensity score is augmented by interaction terms and
polynomials of variables in X until we succeed in balancing the covariates in
each block.
In a second step, given the estimated propensity score from the balanced dis-
tribution, we estimate a univariate nonparametric regression E(Yi|p(Xi),Ti = j)
for j = 0,1. We use two diﬀerent matching methods to construct the con-
trol group, nearest neighbour matching and stratiﬁcation matching. The nearest
neighbour method searches for each ME observation an observation in the control
group with the closest value of the propensity score. Subsequently the average
outcomes in the ME and matched control samples are compared. The strati-
ﬁcation method sorts observations from the lowest to the highest value of the
propensity score. Then strata, deﬁned on the estimated propensity score, are
chosen such that the distributions of covariates is balanced between ME and
15controls. We use the groups on which we based the balancing of the propensity
score. Within each block we take the mean diﬀerence in outcomes between ME




We estimate the propensity score with a logit model of the propensity to start
ME, using a range of the workers’ characteristics, including the labour market
history up to ﬁve years in the past. In addition, we include interaction terms
and polynomials in order to balance the distributions of explanatory variables
between the control and ME groups. The estimation results are tabulated in the
Appendix, Table A-2, and signiﬁcance tests are given in Table A-3.
Figure 5 shows box plots of the distributions of propensity scores for the ME
and the control groups, for men and women. These plots provide a check of the
comparability of the ME and the control group in terms of observable character-
istics.7 A wider overlap in the distributions of the propensity scores results in
better matches between observations in the treatment group and observations in
the control group. The box plots show that the propensity scores are lower than
6We use Stata and the routines by Becker and Ichino (2002).
7The box plots depict for each of the four groups the distribution of the propensity scores.
The interquartile range, i.e. the distance between the 25th and the 75th percentile, is depicted
by a (grey) box. The line within that gray box gives the median. The “whiskers” extend to
the adjacent values, which separate the outliers from the rest of the data. The adjacent values
are the 25th (or the 75th) percentiles minus (plus) 1.5 times the distance between the 25th and
75th percentiles (the interquartile range). For sake of clarity, we have excluded outliers from
the graph; however, the outliers are used in our calculations. The maximum propensity scores
are 0.669 for men, no ME; 0.714 for men, ME; 0.661 for women, no ME; 0.685, women, ME.
160.3 for women and lower than 0.2 for men for most of the observations in our
data. While the control groups have typically lower values of the propensity score
than those who started ME, the distributions do overlap and provide adequate
support for the matching procedures.
Figures 6 and 7 plot the estimated propensity scores against labour market
outcomes, the days employed, days unemployed, and wages in the ﬁrst year after
entry into unemployment. We group the estimated propensity scores into 40
blocks of equal size and calculate average outcomes for ME and controls in each
block. The diﬀerence in outcomes in each block provides the ME eﬀect at a
constant value of the propensity score, i.e. holding observable characteristics
ﬁxed.
Figure 6 reveals that women with ME were employed for fewer days than
women in the control group and that this diﬀerence is about the same size at
all levels of the propensity score. The graph also shows a negative relationship
between days employed and the propensity to work in ME for propensity scores
of less than 0.12. At low values of the propensity score, women who have lower
chances to be employed in a regular job are more likely to start ME than those
with better chances. At higher values of the propensity score, the selection mech-
anism seems to revert and women who face better employment outcomes are more
likely to enter ME.
Remember that a worker who has a marginal job is still entitled to UB. This
entitlement may explain the widening gap in the number of days unemployed
as the propensity score increases because women who are more likely to enter
ME are also collecting UB for a longer period than the control group. The
relationship between wages in the ﬁrst year after entering employment and the
17estimated propensity scores is markedly negative for those with low propensity
scores. Women around the median propensity level, around 0.085 for the control
group and about 0.11 for the women with ME, earn monthly wages well below
e1,000.
Figure 7 shows the corresponding graphs for male workers. The gaps between
ME and controls are greater than for female workers, which suggests an even
stronger negative eﬀect of ME for men. Again we notice that the distribution of
the propensity scores is more concentrated at low levels for men. There are only
three bins for propensity scores higher than 0.1 and negative selection into ME
is even more evident for men than for women.
6.2 Matching Estimates
Our estimation results of the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT) are
presented in Table 3. For each outcome variable, we estimate the ATT using the
stratiﬁcation method and the nearest neighbour method of matching. The choice
of matching method matters little, the diﬀerences between the estimated ATTs
are small. We discuss only the results from the stratiﬁcation method.
For the outcomes in the ﬁrst year since the start of the unemployment spell,
we estimate that women who start ME spend about 40 days less in employment
than the control group, which corresponds to about 30 per cent of the control
group’s mean days employed. The ATT has a small standard error of 1.4. The
results for men are similar, the diﬀerence in days employed is about 49 (SE of 1.8).
This diﬀerence is about 33 per cent of the control group’s mean days employed.
Considering the time spent in unemployment, women who work in ME spend
some 30 days more in unemployment than those who do not, men are estimated
18to spend some 40 days more in unemployment than those who do not work in
ME.
The estimated ATT for the monthly wage in the ﬁrst year states that women
who started ME earn about e136 less per month than women in the control
group. Men who started ME are estimated to earn e207 less per month than
those in the control group. The estimated reduction in wages caused by ME
amounts to about 15 per cent of the average monthly wage of women (e965) who
are in the control group. Men in the control group earned on average e1,390 and
the reduction due to ME amounts to about 16 per cent. This large eﬀect is most
likely a combination of an employment and wage eﬀect, because employment is
considerably lower during the ﬁrst year and wages of those who were not employed
in the year are set equal to 0.
These “short-term” eﬀects during the ﬁrst year are well in line with our con-
siderations about the behavioural incentives in section 3. Especially, we ﬁnd that
individuals who take up ME are much longer unemployed, which is not surpris-
ing given the possibility to claim UB while being marginally employed. On the
other hand, those who move to regular employment directly have less incentive
to exhaust their full beneﬁt entitlement. In the second and third year after un-
employment entry, the the possibilities to claim are much smaller, because of
restricted access to prolonged beneﬁts, making it less desirable to remain un-
employed. We believe that the causal relationship between ME and subsequent
labour market performance is revealed in the medium-term, i.e. once the UB’s
incentives have worn out for the majority of the unemployed.
By looking at the outcome variables in the second year after the start of the
unemployment spell, we see that the diﬀerences are indeed smaller. For example,
19women with ME work about 6 days less than women in the control group; for men,
the diﬀerence is some 10 days. When we look at days unemployed, we ﬁnd no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between workers with and without ME. When
we consider wages, we still estimate that those with ME earn less than those with
no ME. For women it is about e76 less per month, or about 6 per cent of the
control group’s average wage in the second year. For men, the diﬀerence is about
e115 per month, or about 9 per cent of the control group’s average wage.
In the third year after the start of the unemployment spell, the diﬀerences
between those with and those without ME are somewhat smaller than in the
second year. However, we still estimate a negative eﬀect of starting ME on
labour market outcomes, be it days employed, days unemployed, or in terms of
wages. Women who started ME are estimated to have slightly better outcomes
in terms of days unemployed, they are estimated to spend about 4 days less in
unemployment than those in the control group. Women with ME are estimated
to spend about 2 days less in employment (these estimates are not statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels) and they earned e56, or about 6%, less per
month than women in the control group. Men with ME spent about 9 days less
in employment, about 4 days more in unemployment, and earned e90, or about
7%, less per month than men in the control group.
Overall we ﬁnd negative eﬀects of ME on all employment and wage outcomes.
Throughout men are more eﬀected by ME than women. The medium-term results
point at small and negative employment eﬀects of about one week. The wage
eﬀects are, however, still considerable after the third year. Because the diﬀerences
in employment are relatively small, the diﬀerence in wages between ME and
controls is arguably a pure wage loss eﬀect.
20The persistent wage penalty could arise from the fact that those who started
ME have a preference for part-time work and those in the control group seek
full-time employment. The diﬀerence in wages would thus be merely driven by
the resulting diﬀerence in hours worked. While this is a possible critique of our
results—remember that we do not know the number of hours worked—we do
not consider it a likely explanation, because although the number of part-time
workers has increased, especially for women, it is still almost negligible for men.
6.3 Robustness checks
Elapsed unemployment duration As we discussed above, our estimation technique
does not allow for the elapsed unemployment duration to aﬀect the probability of
starting ME. It is probable that some workers have an increasing risk of ME the
longer they are unemployed, for others, this risk might be falling. We have re-
estimated the ATTs for diﬀerent durations of elapsed unemployment and starting
ME.
Table 4 reports the results for the smaller group of individuals who started
ME in the ﬁrst 3 months after becoming unemployed, and for the group of all
individuals who started ME during the ﬁrst year after becoming unemployed.
Comparing these results to the baseline case in Table 4, we see that the choice
of the treatment group makes indeed a diﬀerence. All eﬀects are smallest for the
group of unemployed who start ME during the ﬁrst 3 months and largest for the
group who started in the ﬁrst 12 months. For example, the employment eﬀects
are two days in the ﬁrst case and -10 days in the second case for the third year
for women, and -5 and -15 days for men. Wages per month in the third year
are e38 or e83 lower for female ME workers and e66 or e133 lower for males,
21depending on the length of the entry period. This result indicates that we cannot
fully control for selection into ME by matching on the conditions at the start of
the unemployment spell, because changes in behaviour over time seem to play a
role. However, although the magnitude of the eﬀects depends on the choice of the
ME group, the main result is unchanged. Marginal employment has a negative,
if small, impact on future employment and substantial negative wage eﬀects in
all samples.
Selection eﬀects We have seen above that while most unemployed enter unem-
ployment from a previous job, not all of them do so. ME is attractive, amongst
other things, because it provides relatively cheap access to social insurance. Ar-
guably some workers are less attached to the labour market, for example, those
who start searching for a job without being entitled to UB, and have therefore
diﬀerent search strategies than workers who are closely attached to the labour
market.
We re-estimated the ATTs of ME by restricting our sample to workers who en-
ter unemployment directly from employment, rather than from any other labour
market state. (Entry period to ME is six months.) The results from this exer-
cise are tabulated in Panel 1 in Table 5. We note that the results show a greater
penalty from working ME in subsequent periods than the results presented above.
The negative eﬀects of ME lessen over time, but they are still present in the third
year after the start of the unemployment spell.
In particular, focussing on the medium-term outcomes after three years, we
estimate for women in this subset a wage penalty of about e60 per month, in
comparison to their peers who did not start ME. For men, the wage penalty is
about e126.
22We noted above, that previous experience of ME makes a worker more likely to
start ME, all other things equal. Again, we worry that the previous experience
of ME, although we control for this in the estimation of the propensity score,
might be associated with unobserved characteristics that are correlated with our
outcome measures. We therefore restrict the sample to workers who had no
experience of ME in the ﬁve years prior to the unemployment spell and estimate
the ATTs of ME. The results are tabulated in Panel 2 of Table 5. We see that for
this subgroup of workers, the negative eﬀects are slightly less severe for women
and slightly more negative for men.
7 Summary and Conclusions
In our analysis, we investigated the consequences of starting a marginal job for
unemployed workers. In particular, we asked ourselves whether the unemployed
who work few hours face better labour market outcomes than those who do not
work while collecting UB. A priori it is not clear if those who work in ME improve
their labour market status, by signalling eﬀort, possibly increasing the job oﬀer
arrival rate, etc., or worsen it by reducing their job search eﬀorts.
Our results strongly indicate that for unemployed workers there is no positive
consequence of marginal employment on subsequent regular employment. Our
results are more in line with the US evidence in Autor and Houseman (2005) and
stand in contrast to European studies, which ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of temporary
jobs on transitions to regular employment. Marginal employment does not act
as a stepping stone into regular jobs and all outcome measures we investigate—
employment, unemployment, and wages—are less favourable for workers who
started marginal employment than for those who did not. The eﬀects are bigger
23and more persistent over time for men than for women. Diﬀerences in outcomes
lessen over time, for example, after three years, women who started ME earn
about 6% less than women who did not. For men, neither employment nor wages
of marginal workers catch up with workers in the control group after three years,
wages are about 7% lower.
We also ﬁnd that unemployed workers who are most likely to start marginal
employment are individuals who are typically disadvantaged in the labour market,
i.e. the young, those with little formal education, and those with interrupted
employment careers. A worker with these characteristics would be the target of
standard active labour market policy measures. Unemployed workers who are
entitled to beneﬁts are more likely to take a marginal job than those who have
no entitlement.
A way to improve chances of marginally employed workers in the labour mar-
ket would to integrate ME into the government’s active labour market policy,
where private sector employment programs already exist. ME is an income sub-
sidy for workers who are eligible for UB and supply a minimum amount of hours.
For jobs earning just above the marginal threshold, however, no subsidy is avail-
able and the full social security contributions have to be paid. This creates a
huge disincentive to work in these kind of (part-time) jobs above the marginal
threshold.
An extension of the income subsidy towards jobs with higher wages could
create incentives for labour supply in the jobs above the marginal threshold and
possibly also facilitate transitions into regular jobs. The idea would be to allow
unemployed workers to keep a share of their UB, which reduces with wage earned,
in order to phase out the discontinuity created by the marginal threshold. At
24the same time social security contributions could be reduced for these jobs to
create an incentive for employers to hire more workers. Of course the subsidy
has to be limited in time and restricted to special target groups, e.g long-term
unemployed, in order to prevent windfall beneﬁciaries. For several countries
positive experiences with income subsidy measures of this type exist, like the US,
Canada, and the UK where they were part of the welfare reforms (Blundell and
Hoynes, 2004; Card and Hyslop, 2005).
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Figure 3: Development of marginal employment over time in the sample; vertical
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30Figure 5: Distribution of the estimated propensity score in ME and control group.
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3Table 1: Sample description
Females Males Total
Control Group 84,105 94,322 178,427
ME Group
ME within 6 months 7,789 4,176 11,965
8.48% 4.24% 6.28%
ME within 3 months 5,587 3,143 8,730
6.23% 3.22% 4.66%
ME within 12 months 9,791 5,058 14,849
10.43% 5.09% 7.68%
Enter Unemployment from Employment*
Control Group 61,312 69,899 131,211
ME within 6 months 5,303 3,015 8,318
7.96% 4.14% 5.96%
Note: Control group - individuals who never take up a marginal job before
their unemployment spell ends
ME group - individuals entering a marginal job while unemployed and within
x months after unemployment start
percentages taken over the sum of ME and control group
* individuals who had a job within the last month before start of unemployment
34Table 2: Recalls to the Same Employer
Females Males Total
Job to ME Recall Rate 16.07% 13.37% 15.09%
Number of Observations 8,318
ME to Job Recall Rate 27.24% 26.12% 26.83%
Number of Observations 8,195
Job to Job Recall Rate 33.37% 21.95% 27.32%
Number of Observations 120,459
Note: xxx
Table 3: Estimated average eﬀect of Marginal Employment (ATT).
Women Men
Stratiﬁcation Nearest Neighbour Stratiﬁcation Nearest Neighbour
ATT (SE) ATT (SE) ATT (SE) ATT (SE)
The ﬁrst year
Employment -40.762 (1.37) -39.936 (2.03) -48.866 (1.76) -51.164 (2.67)
Unemployment 30.523 (1.26) 30.478 (1.81) 37.647 (1.67) 40.388 (2.37)
Wage -138.637 (7.61) -135.885 (10.93) -207.508 (12.59) -227.148 (17.92)
The second year
Employment -5.564 (1.77) -3.979 (2.46) -9.927 (2.23) -12.646 (3.23)
Unemployment -2.133 (1.19) -1.827 (1.66) 1.935 (1.68) 3.543 (2.35)
Wage -76.047 (7.55) -69.317 (10.95) -115.155 (12.47) -130.973 (18.42)
The third year
Employment -2.032 (1.16) -2.807 (1.63) -8.798 (2.34) -10.699 (3.39)
Unemployment -3.937 (1.30) -5.101 (1.86) 3.632 (1.77) 4.377 (2.41)
Wage -55.867 (8.00) -59.303 (11.53) -90.250 (13.73) -99.968 (20.03)
Treated (Control) 7,766 (83,793) 7,766 (6,958) 4,144 (93,561) 4,176 (4,619)
Note: Start of ME within 6 months of start of unemployment. ATT refers to the
average treatment eﬀect on the treated. SE are standard errors.
35Table 4: Estimated average eﬀect of Marginal Employment (ATT), diﬀerent entry
periods.
Women Men
Stratiﬁcation Nearest Neighbour Stratiﬁcation Nearest Neighbour
ATT (SE) ATT (SE) ATT (SE) ATT (SE)
ME within 3 months
The ﬁrst year
Employment -25.090 (1.62) -22.860 (2.36) -34.270 (2.04) -34.067 (3.06)
Unemployment 18.318 (1.43) 16.799 (2.06) 27.206 (1.85) 26.983 (2.69)
Wage -97.494 (8.65) -95.084 (12.51) -158.971 (13.85) -161.390 (20.34)
The second year
Employment 1.148 (2.02) 3.685 (2.84) -3.942 (2.50) -5.367 (3.66)
Unemployment -4.264 (1.32) -5.430 (1.91) -0.755 (1.85) -1.170 (2.63)
Wage -53.484 (8.71) -43.996 (12.69) -97.758 -(97.76) -107.127 (20.86)
The third year
Employment 2.646 (2.10) 3.825 (2.96) -5.643 (2.62) -4.292 (3.85)
Unemployment -3.937 (1.30) -5.101 (1.86) 2.260 (1.97) -0.691 (2.71)
Wage -38.561 (9.35) -42.006 (13.60) -66.091 (15.53) -54.642 (22.80)
Treated (Control) 5571 (83793) 5571 (5118) 3119 (93560) 3140 (3716)
ME within 12 months
The ﬁrst year
Employment -58.993 (1.24) -60.841 (1.84) -66.283 (1.63) -68.772 (2.45)
Unemployment 43.193 (1.20) 44.521 (1.68) 50.948 (1.60) 53.476 (2.25)
Wage -211.951 (7.00) -221.121 (10.02) -312.804 (11.96) -317.476 (16.74)
The second year
Employment -18.832 (1.64) -20.747 (2.27) -20.819 (2.09) -23.818 (2.97)
Unemployment 2.773 (1.15) 2.521 (1.58) 7.666 (1.62) 8.825 (2.20)
Wage -115.191 (6.87) -127.088 (9.93) -166.866 (11.59) -178.471 (16.90)
The third year
Employment -10.287 (1.69) -11.566 (2.34) -15.768 (2.18) -18.788 (3.10)
Unemployment 0.874 (1.10) 0.394 (1.52) 6.753 (1.67) 9.254 (2.23)
Wage -83.545 (7.17) -90.111 (10.38) -133.261 (12.58) -147.740 (18.18)
Treated (Control) 9761 (83793) 9761 (8514) 5024 (93561) 5058 (5428)
Note: ATT refers to the average treatment eﬀect on the treated. SE are standard
errors.
36Table 5: Estimated average eﬀect of Marginal Employment (ATT), subgroups.
Women Men
Stratiﬁcation Nearest Neighbour Stratiﬁcation Nearest Neighbour
ATT (SE) ATT (SE) ATT (SE) ATT (SE)
Had no previous experience of ME, entered ME within 6 months
The ﬁrst year
Employment -45.163 (1.81) -43.925 (2.75) -55.954 (2.16) -53.378 (3.35)
Unemployment 34.200 (1.73) 34.236 (2.50) 43.912 (2.07) 43.141 (3.02)
Wage -156.963 (10.91) -155.290 (15.94) -246.151 (15.97) -242.512 (23.16)
The second year
Employment -2.726 (2.45) -1.849 (3.46) -10.563 (2.81) -7.407 (4.10)
Unemployment -5.327 (1.63) -2.509 (2.28) 1.775 (2.08) 2.343 (2.91)
Wage -86.600 (10.67) -84.957 (15.72) -158.628 (15.53) -164.889 (23.40)
The third year
Employment 0.915 (2.54) 0.805 (3.56) -8.857 (2.93) -6.054 (4.29)
Unemployment -3.436 (1.60) -2.512 (2.24) 2.948 (2.18) 2.645 (2.98)
Wage -60.355 (11.18) -67.629 (16.45) -126.071 (17.17) -137.886 (25.50)
Treated (Control) 3,878 (63,816) 3,878 (3,671) 2,483 (81,501) 2,505 (3,067)
Enter unemployment from employment, ME within 6 months
The ﬁrst year
Employment -48.608 (1.70) -46.625 (2.47) -52.395 (2.17) -53.901 (3.23)
Unemployment 36.514 (1.53) 34.686 (2.20) 43.215 (2.04) 46.046 (2.89)
Wage -156.394 (9.64) -123.689 (13.42) -206.756 (15.70) -217.315 (21.88)
The second year
Employment -10.256 (2.15) -6.853 (2.97) -14.658 (2.69) -12.144 (3.84)
Unemployment -1.190 (1.45) -3.220 (2.03) 6.380 (2.12) 6.886 (2.86)
Wage -99.711 (9.56) -76.462 (13.61) -134.206 (15.41) -135.732 (22.35)
The third year
Employment -8.999 (2.25) -7.603 (3.12) -11.427 (2.82) -9.243 (4.06)
Unemployment 0.748 (1.44) 1.171 (1.98) 4.590 (2.21) 2.980 (2.97)
Wage -71.717 (10.38) -51.010 (14.79) -105.164 (17.37) -104.094 (25.11)
Treated (Control) 4,725 (56,109) 4,275 (4,234) 2,562 (61,210) 2,583 (2,837)
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Table A-1: Descriptive statistics.
Women Men
No marginal Marginal No marginal Marginal
employment employment employment employment
Variable Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
BACKGROUND
Age (years) 32.485 (8.388) 32.553 (8.028) 32.291 (8.459) 31.677 (8.085)
(Age)2/100 11.257 (5.708) 11.241 (5.474) 11.142 (5.749) 10.687 (5.491)
(Age)3/1000 41.320 (30.715) 40.955 (29.472) 40.806 (30.912) 38.259 (29.471)
Foreign nationality 0.135 (0.342) 0.102 (0.303) 0.197 (0.398) 0.143 (0.350)
Married 0.488 (0.500) 0.478 (0.500) 0.424 (0.494) 0.370 (0.483)
Entitled to UI beneﬁts 0.698 (0.459) 0.648 (0.478) 0.742 (0.438) 0.713 (0.452)
Education
Compulsory or less 0.423 (0.494) 0.401 (0.490) 0.385 (0.487) 0.369 (0.483)
Apprenticeship 0.332 (0.471) 0.330 (0.470) 0.470 (0.499) 0.427 (0.495)
Middle school 0.103 (0.304) 0.105 (0.307) 0.036 (0.186) 0.039 (0.195)
High school 0.071 (0.257) 0.081 (0.273) 0.031 (0.173) 0.058 (0.233)
Vocational high
school
0.031 (0.174) 0.034 (0.182) 0.052 (0.222) 0.062 (0.242)
University 0.039 (0.193) 0.048 (0.214) 0.026 (0.160) 0.044 (0.204)
Entry month
March 0.170 (0.376) 0.176 (0.381) 0.207 (0.405) 0.197 (0.398)
April 0.283 (0.450) 0.215 (0.411) 0.245 (0.430) 0.216 (0.412)
May 0.155 (0.362) 0.157 (0.364) 0.164 (0.371) 0.155 (0.362)
June 0.123 (0.329) 0.131 (0.338) 0.132 (0.338) 0.148 (0.355)
July 0.151 (0.358) 0.179 (0.383) 0.136 (0.343) 0.153 (0.360)
August 0.117 (0.321) 0.142 (0.349) 0.115 (0.319) 0.125 (0.331)
Sector
Agriculture 0.008 (0.091) 0.009 (0.096) 0.015 (0.123) 0.016 (0.124)
Manufacturing 0.133 (0.340) 0.131 (0.338) 0.372 (0.483) 0.339 (0.473)
Construction 0.010 (0.100) 0.010 (0.101) 0.162 (0.368) 0.085 (0.279)
Sales 0.157 (0.364) 0.197 (0.398) 0.125 (0.331) 0.169 (0.375)
Tourism 0.289 (0.453) 0.176 (0.381) 0.166 (0.372) 0.154 (0.361)
Service 0.101 (0.301) 0.125 (0.330) 0.025 (0.157) 0.030 (0.171)
Technical 0.011 (0.103) 0.012 (0.108) 0.052 (0.222) 0.071 (0.257)
Oﬃce 0.194 (0.396) 0.219 (0.413) 0.057 (0.232) 0.082 (0.275)
Health 0.104 (0.306) 0.131 (0.337) 0.041 (0.199) 0.071 (0.258)
Region
Vienna 0.183 (0.387) 0.192 (0.394) 0.224 (0.417) 0.352 (0.477)
Lower Austria 0.131 (0.338) 0.140 (0.347) 0.139 (0.346) 0.130 (0.337)
Upper Austria 0.136 (0.343) 0.161 (0.368) 0.138 (0.345) 0.114 (0.318)
Salzburg 0.097 (0.295) 0.081 (0.273) 0.085 (0.279) 0.086 (0.281)
Tyrol 0.188 (0.391) 0.134 (0.340) 0.159 (0.365) 0.111 (0.314)
Burgenland 0.023 (0.151) 0.019 (0.138) 0.024 (0.153) 0.016 (0.124)
Styria 0.138 (0.345) 0.176 (0.381) 0.137 (0.344) 0.136 (0.342)
Carinthia 0.103 (0.304) 0.096 (0.294) 0.094 (0.292) 0.073 (0.260)
In the year before the start of the spell
Number of previous
jobs
1.521 (1.352) 1.347 (1.857) 1.734 (1.470) 1.660 (1.496)
% of year employed 0.590 (0.372) 0.586 (0.393) 0.633 (0.347) 0.619 (0.361)
Monthly wage 5.758 (2.700) 5.586 (2.713) 6.554 (2.253) 6.380 (2.322)
Continued on next page.
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Women Men
No marginal Marginal No marginal Marginal
employment employment employment employment
Variable Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
% of year marginally
employed
0.045 (0.174) 0.183 (0.331) 0.019 (0.108) 0.123 (0.269)
% of year on mater-
nity leave
0.072 (0.239) 0.080 (0.253) – –
Number of unem-
ployment spells
0.868 (1.101) 0.660 (1.175) 0.952 (1.140) 0.843 (1.138)
% of year unem-
ployed
0.170 (0.227) 0.152 (0.236) 0.172 (0.225) 0.168 (0.236)
In the second year before the start of the spell
Number of previous
jobs
1.302 (1.282) 1.142 (1.624) 1.610 (1.517) 1.566 (1.481)
% of year employed 0.536 (0.397) 0.511 (0.414) 0.633 (0.359) 0.599 (0.375)
Monthly wage 5.365 (2.960) 5.103 (3.034) 6.432 (2.352) 6.265 (2.439)
% of year marginally
employed
0.043 (0.164) 0.133 (0.288) 0.016 (0.095) 0.074 (0.207)
% of year on mater-
nity leave
0.119 (0.300) 0.131 (0.312) – –
Number of unem-
ployment spells
0.883 (1.173) 0.688 (1.098) 1.048 (1.301) 0.979 (1.439)
% of year unem-
ployed
0.166 (0.242) 0.162 (0.261) 0.184 (0.247) 0.191 (0.261)
In the third year before the start of the spell
Number of previous
jobs
1.210 (1.216) 1.067 (1.542) 1.550 (1.584) 1.488 (1.252)
% of year employed 0.525 (0.407) 0.491 (0.423) 0.644 (0.367) 0.596 (0.387)
Monthly wage 5.172 (3.060) 4.869 (3.155) 6.342 (2.413) 6.145 (2.541)
% of year marginally
employed
0.035 (0.149) 0.097 (0.251) 0.012 (0.081) 0.044 (0.165)
% of year on mater-
nity leave
0.121 (0.301) 0.138 (0.318) – –
Number of unem-
ployment spells
0.805 (1.165) 0.616 (1.181) 0.964 (1.371) 0.862 (1.178)
% of year unem-
ployed
0.150 (0.238) 0.145 (0.256) 0.165 (0.238) 0.171 (0.257)
In the fourth year before the start of the spell
Number of previous
jobs
1.185 (1.356) 1.050 (1.771) 1.524 (1.633) 1.450 (1.543)
% of year employed 0.517 (0.411) 0.480 (0.424) 0.645 (0.370) 0.598 (0.397)
Monthly wage 5.073 (3.100) 4.725 (3.210) 6.296 (2.427) 6.040 (2.611)
% of year marginally
employed
0.030 (0.140) 0.082 (0.235) 0.010 (0.076) 0.031 (0.139)
% of year on mater-
nity leave
0.116 (0.296) 0.140 (0.319) – –
Number of unem-
ployment spells
0.744 (1.255) 0.588 (1.288) 0.899 (1.461) 0.770 (1.270)
% of year unem-
ployed
0.136 (0.228) 0.129 (0.238) 0.151 (0.229) 0.151 (0.248)
In the ﬁfth year before the start of the spell
Continued on next page.
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Women Men
No marginal Marginal No marginal Marginal
employment employment employment employment
Variable Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Number of previous
jobs
1.120 (1.316) 1.015 (1.790) 1.465 (1.477) 1.414 (1.569)
% of year employed 0.499 (0.416) 0.472 (0.429) 0.636 (0.377) 0.593 (0.399)
Monthly wage 4.876 (3.183) 4.607 (3.249) 6.135 (2.562) 5.860 (2.741)
% of year marginally
employed
0.027 (0.134) 0.068 (0.215) 0.009 (0.074) 0.028 (0.132)
% of year on mater-
nity leave
0.114 (0.296) 0.141 (0.323) – –
Number of unem-
ployment spells
0.661 (1.187) 0.521 (1.323) 0.808 (1.390) 0.688 (1.130)
% of year unem-
ployed
0.119 (0.216) 0.113 (0.226) 0.132 (0.216) 0.127 (0.223)
N 83,793 5,571 93,560 3,119
Note: Wages are Euros, deﬂated to 1995 prices.
40Table A-2: Logit estimations of Marginal Employment.
Women Men
Marginal eﬀect (SE) Marginal eﬀect (SE)
Age 0.020 (0.006) 0.018 (0.004)
(Age)2/100 -0.052 (0.018) -0.051 (0.012)
(Age)3/1000 0.004 (0.002) 0.005 (0.001)
Education Reference category: Compulsory or less
Apprenticeship -0.0001 (0.002) -0.005 (0.001)
Middle school -0.003 (0.003) -0.007 (0.003)
High school 0.0002 (0.004) -0.001 (0.003)
Vocational high school -0.007 (0.005) -0.008 (0.002)
University -0.015 (0.004) -0.014 (0.003)
Foreign nationality -0.015 (0.004) -0.013 (0.002)
Married -0.007 (0.002) -0.005 (0.001)
Entry from employment -0.017 (0.003) -0.005 (0.002)
Entitled to UI beneﬁts -0.004 (0.003) 0.003 (0.001)
Region Reference category: Vienna
Lower Austria 0.001 (0.003) -0.016 (0.001)
Upper Austria 0.004 (0.003) -0.020 (0.001)
Salzburg -0.007 (0.003) -0.015 (0.002)
Tyrol -0.012 (0.003) -0.022 (0.001)
Burgenland -0.011 (0.005) -0.022 (0.002)
Styria 0.012 (0.003) -0.015 (0.001)
Carinthia -0.001 (0.003) -0.019 (0.002)
Occupation Reference category: Manufacturing
Agriculture, Construction 0.002 (0.009) -0.017 (0.002)
Sales 0.011 (0.003) 0.012 (0.002)
Tourism -0.016 (0.003) 0.004 (0.002)
Service 0.010 (0.004) 0.007 (0.004)
Technical -0.002 (0.008) 0.014 (0.003)
Oﬃce 0.008 (0.003) 0.015 (0.003)
Health 0.008 (0.004) 0.017 (0.004)
Entry month Reference category: March
April -0.010 (0.003) -0.005 (0.002)
May -0.004 (0.003) 0.000 (0.002)
June -0.005 (0.003) 0.003 (0.002)
July -0.006 (0.003) 0.000 (0.002)
August -0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002)
Monthly wage (ln)
ﬁrst year (t − 1) 0.002 (0.001) 0.0001 (0.0004)
second year (t − 2) 0.001 (0.001) 0.0005 (0.0004)
third year (t − 3) 0.0004 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.0004)
fourth year (t − 4) -0.001 (0.001) 0.0007 (0.0004)
ﬁfth year (t − 5) 0.00001 (0.001) -0.0004 (0.0004)
Number of previous jobs
ﬁrst year (t − 1) -0.007 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
second year (t − 2) -0.004 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
third year (t − 3) 0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
fourth year (t − 4) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
ﬁfth year (t − 5) 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
(ﬁrst year)2 0.0001 (0.00004) 0.000 (0.000)
% of year employed
ﬁrst year (t − 1) -0.037 (0.017) 0.006 (0.011)
second year (t − 2) 0.003 (0.016) -0.007 (0.010)
third year (t − 3) -0.026 (0.017) -0.019 (0.011)
fourth year (t − 4) 0.016 (0.017) -0.034 (0.010)
ﬁfth year (t − 5) -0.005 (0.017) -0.003 (0.010)
Continued on next page.
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Women Men
Marginal eﬀect (SE) Marginal eﬀect (SE)
(ﬁrst year)2 0.049 (0.014) 0.002 (0.009)
(second year)2 -0.003 (0.014) 0.006 (0.008)
(third year)2 0.014 (0.015) 0.013 (0.009)
(fourth year)2 -0.020 (0.015) 0.026 (0.009)
(ﬁfth year)2 0.008 (0.015) 0.002 (0.009)
% of year marginally employed
ﬁrst year (t − 1) 0.293 (0.014) 0.218 (0.012)
second year (t − 2) 0.064 (0.015) 0.093 (0.012)
third year (t − 3) 0.099 (0.017) 0.061 (0.015)
fourth year (t − 4) 0.131 (0.018) 0.053 (0.017)
ﬁfth year (t − 5) 0.076 (0.020) 0.052 (0.018)
(ﬁrst year)2 -0.202 (0.015) -0.155 (0.012)
(second year)2 -0.063 (0.018) -0.092 (0.015)
(third year)2 -0.082 (0.018) -0.055 (0.017)
(fourth year)2 -0.124 (0.020) -0.049 (0.021)
(ﬁfth year)2 -0.073 (0.022) -0.046 (0.021)
ﬁrst year * second year -1.686 (1.380) -0.887 (1.251)
ﬁrst year * third year -2.089 (1.536) 1.828 (1.465)
ﬁrst year * fourth year 0.026 (1.800) -2.261 (1.896)
ﬁrst year * ﬁfth year 3.900 (1.608) 0.637 (1.737)
ﬁrst year * previously em-
ployed
0.011 (0.008) 0.005 (0.006)
ﬁrst year * monthly wage in
t − 1
0.004 (0.001) -0.0001 (0.001)
Number of previous unemploy-
ment spells
ﬁrst year (t − 1) -0.008 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001)
second year (t − 2) -0.005 (0.002) -0.0002 (0.001)
third year (t − 3) -0.008 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001)
fourth year (t − 4) -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001)
ﬁfth year (t − 5) -0.004 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001)
(ﬁrst year)2 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001)
% of year unemployed
ﬁrst year (t − 1) -0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.004)
second year (t − 2) 0.025 (0.006) 0.006 (0.004)
third year (t − 3) 0.005 (0.007) 0.008 (0.004)
fourth year (t − 4) -0.002 (0.007) -0.0001 (0.004)
ﬁfth year (t − 5) 0.013 (0.006) 0.001 (0.004)
% of year on maternity leave
ﬁrst year (t − 1) -0.014 (0.028) —
second year (t − 2) 0.003 (0.019) —
third year (t − 3) 0.005 (0.019) —
fourth year (t − 4) 0.007 (0.020) —
ﬁfth year (t − 5) 0.034 (0.018) —
(ﬁrst year)2 0.013 (0.026) —
(second year)2 0.013 (0.018) —
(third year)2 -0.014 (0.018) —
(fourth year)2 -0.010 (0.019) —
(ﬁfth year)2 -0.023 (0.019) —
N no ME (N ME) 86907 (9788) 94580 (5039)
Note: Marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable.
Wages are Euros, deﬂated to 1995 prices.
42Table A-3: Testing of joint signiﬁcance in logit estimation.
Variables (degrees of freedom) Women Men
χ2 χ2
Education (5) 10.82a 29.43
Occupation (7) 96.75 158.02
Previous employment spells (5) 24.37 12.80e
Previous unemployment spells (5) 85.67 23.94
Previous days employed (5) 7.11b 18.70
Previous days marginally employed (5) 712.35 606.47
Previous days unemployed (5) 40.14 10.81f
Previous days maternity leave (5) 5.34c —
Previous wages (5) 12.01d 9.95g
All of these (42) 1123.95 943.83
Note: All test statistics have p-values of less than 0.01 except:
a0.0551, b0.2124; c0.3764; d0.0347; e0.0254; f0.0552; g0.0765.
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